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1 Introduction
Robots are entering not only our workplace but also our homes. Research in
human-robot interaction (HRI) is growing exponentially, with many systems
and studies evaluating the acceptance of robots in different contexts and among
different populations. Robots are now perceived as machines that not only will
support humans in specific tasks, but will also complement them in activities
that humans cannot perform. As such, robots will have to act autonomously,
performing complex tasks in an intelligent way, as well as be able to interact with
humans, adapt to them and perform activities together. One of the challenges
that AI (Artificial Intelligence) and robotics face nowadays is how to create social
AI and social robotics that interact with humans in an engaging, natural, and
most importantly humane way, recognizing and respecting human values and
social norms. To do that, researchers must develop new models, new algorithms
and new techniques that will endow our machines with emotional and social
competencies. This requires an understanding of people and their goals and
emotions as well as the surrounding context, including the social context.
The advent of robotics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques is also
raising serious ethical concerns in our society. When the power of decisions
is delegated into machines, questions concerning the morality of such decisions
must be questioned. Robots should not only be able to estimate what actions are
instrumentally “good” for their goals, but they should also be able to distinguish
what actions are morally “good” from those that are morally “bad”.
We argue that the question of morality in social robots can be partially
answered through their capacity for empathy. As a biological force that makes
humans care for one another, empathy has had a fundamental role in the survival
and prosperity of the human race. Going into the future, it is imperative that
robots are programmed to have empathy so they are endowed with a human-like
urge to look after other people. In fact, robots can have a form of empathy that
can even be more conducive to human prosperity as it can avoid the pitfalls of
being modulated by factors such as proximity or in-group partiality.
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Essentially, for robots to be able to have successful human-robot interactions
they must be endowed with emotional processing, as well as be able to respond
emotionally to the humans and adapt to their environmental and moral context.
We will overview this challenging research area and present some application
cases borrowed from educational and entertainment robotics, where empathy,
emotion sharing, and group-based emotions have been explored to deepen the
relation between humans and social robots. We then conclude with a discussion
of how these emotional processes are a fundamental piece of the puzzle that is
the creation of robots with the capacity for complex moral reasoning.
2 Emotional Processes in Social Robots
The importance of emotions in social robots is fully inspired by the role emotions
have in human behaviour. Not only emotions were identified as a mean to form
and maintain social relationships, as they may also establish a social position
through intentions or decisions [33]. Therefore, including these notions from
the social psychology into the social robotics field provides researchers ways
of understanding and improving the interaction between humans and robots.
Creating computational models of emotions was indeed pointed as having critical
importance since one of the first social robots, Kismet [6]. The author claimed
that the perception and the consequent interaction people have towards a social
robot is shaped by the observable behaviour and the manner in which the robot
reacts and responds to people.
Further studies have extended this belief in more detail by analysing which
emotional processes can contribute to the successful creation of social robots.
For instance, emotional expressions (through facial expressions of happiness,
sadness and anger) had a positive influence on people’s enjoyability when com-
pared to non-emotional expressions [4]. Additionally, another user study with
an educational scenario also revealed how the presence of emotional expressions
can positively convey the learning performance of children by a robotic tutor
[45]. Some of the main characteristics of this robotic tutor, regarding its social
supportive behaviour, were non-verbal feedback, attention building, empathy,
and communicativeness. Finally, among different extensions of these emotional
processes, engagement gestures as tracking a human partner’s face were reported
as an appropriate ability for a robot that converses and collaborates [47]. This
ability provides a way of maintaining the connection with one another, at the
same time it constitutes a sophisticated and smoother interaction that can be
perceived as more reliable.
The previous examples illustrate how social robots can enter our lives in
several domains as domestic, entertainment, healthcare, education, etc. How-
ever, independently of being our companions, tutors, or simple operators, the
collaboration and communication with them will be certainly required. Fur-
thermore, the quality of this communication can even be more effective towards
successful interactions between humans and robots, which may be achieved by
introducing different emotional processes into the communication and collabo-
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ration skills of the robots (as also seen in the previous examples). One way to do
this, can be by trying to embed a kind of artificial empathy in the robot, since
empathy constitutes one of the most relevant emotional processes able of pro-
moting the relationship among one another. Previous findings also encourage
this idea, where a robot with empathic behaviours was perceived as friendlier
and, therefore, able to foster an improved relationship as a companion [32].
The definition of empathy has evolved for the past years among the different
scopes, interpretations, or possible theories it may include. Nevertheless, Cuff
et al. [13] have recently reviewed this concept and proposed a definition that
provides an answer to most inconsistencies from previous findings. It includes
both affective and cognitive aspects since it produces an emotional response
upon the understanding of an emotional stimulus whose source is not one’s
own. Moreover, the emotional response consists of an emotion that might be
or not followed by an emotional behaviour, and although it is automatically
elicited, this empathic process can later be controlled, reframed, suppressed, or
even modified. Additionally, the resulting emotion on the observer is as similar
as possible to the target’s own emotion depending on the empathic accuracy
by the observer, which will inevitably shape its perception of the situation. A
final relevant consideration in their careful definition of empathy refers to the
source of the emotional stimulus, which does not have to be another person and
may generally be any element containing an emotionally-laden stimulus. For in-
stance, it can be a fictional or imaginary person as in books or animated films,
where there are no living entities and people still respond emotionally. Conse-
quently, this last evidence also bridges the study of empathy in social robotics
where previous findings strongly suggest that people conceive anthropomorphic
models of interactive robots [28].
Another relevant consideration that Cuff et al. has exposed while reviewing
the concept of empathy [13] refers to the Self-Other distinction during the em-
pathic process. Some authors argue that for a complete awareness that the emo-
tional experience comes from an external source, the observer should maintain
a clear self-other distinction. Alternatively, neuroscience findings have shown
a partial overlapped between the brain activations of someone taking the Self
perspective and the Other perspective, which is coherent with the opposite Self-
Other merging theory [24]. Decety and Sommerville (2003) have even mentioned
that without some Self-Other merging the understanding the other’s emotion
would be difficult, compromising the cognitive empathy [15]. Moreover, the
importance of referring Self-Other merging is naturally extended to the topic
of social identification [49], where social coordination is facilitated [20], and
the social bonds are fostered by including the other in one’s own mental self-
representation. This evidence is also definite as Tropp and Wright (2001) have
demonstrated that the degree to which the in-group is included in the Self can
measure the ingroup identification [50].
All the discussed ideas sustain the relevance of endowing social robots with
empathic behaviours, as well as the ability to elicit empathy in humans dur-
ing their interactions. Therefore, it is important to embed a robot with more
bonding characteristics, to explore how an artificial cognitive empathy can be
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implemented in robots and what effects we hope to produce from this imple-
mentation.
We know that since our childhood until we die we live in a social context,
with day by day social interactions. Our own emotions propel us towards inter-
acting with others and sharing them is a big part of our intimate relationships.
So, could we improve the relationship between a human and a robot if it shared
its emotions? Rimé claims that “the social sharing of emotion occurs in dis-
course, when individuals communicate openly with one or more persons about
the circumstances of the emotion-eliciting event and about their own feelings
and emotional reactions”[41, page 19] and presents support from studies showing
how people after an emotional event try to share it with someone else. This in
turn, contributes to a sense of closeness in the relationship and greater intimacy,
which is something we look for in our most meaningful relationships. Therefore,
we believe that giving a social robot the capacity to share its emotions can be
an important implementation to facilitate human-robot interactions. This way,
it may make the human much more involved in the interaction.
As empathy does not lead always to behavioural outcomes, it is not possi-
ble to guarantee that by eliciting empathy in humans towards robots, this will
always reflect in a different behaviour towards the robot, or even a prosocial be-
haviour towards it. Still, we think that by endowing the robot with human-like
characteristics and empathic capabilities, it can better do its role (e.g. support-
ing a student in class by understanding when it is having difficulties and helping
him), and it can make the interaction more meaningful. We will now present
some use case scenarios we developed that support this idea.
3 First Steps: Case Studies With Humane Social
Robots
We are on the brink of a revolution were machines are compelled to act in an
empathic manner, capable of understanding and sharing affective experiences
that resonate with us. In this section we will describe three examples where so-
cial robots were programmed with the type of emotional processes we previously
described.
The three examples we will explore are: an empathic social robot that tutors
teenagers and was developed in the EMOTE project; a social robot that shares
its emotions with its users; and a social robot that plays a team-based card
game, while expressing group-based emotions.
3.1 EMOTE: Creating Robotic Tutors With Empathy
One of the most important qualities of a good teacher is empathy. For a teacher
to be accepted, to motivate, to engage, and to fully be inspirational, empathic
qualities are needed. Perceiving, listening attentively, motivating, encourag-
ing, looking into the eyes, placing oneself into the learner’s shoes are necessary
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characteristics that all influential teachers have. Although there has been sig-
nificant work has been devoted to the design of artificial tutors with human
capabilities with the aim of helping increase the efficiency achieved with a hu-
man instructor, these systems often lack the personal, empathic and human
elements that characterise a traditional teacher and fail to engage and motivate
students in the same way a human teacher does. Empathy and engagement,
abilities that are key to influence students’ learning, are often forgotten when
such learning systems are created. To address this issue, research on intelligent
tutoring systems has recently shifted towards a more learner-centric approach
to endow artificial tutors with the ability to perceive the emotions experienced
by learners and incorporate these into pedagogical strategies to build more ef-
fective computer-based learning systems [8]. Examples include determining the
appropriateness of affective interventions by means of empathic strategies as a
response to a learner’s emotional state [42]. Recent research on socially intel-
ligent robots shows that robots are increasingly being studied as partners that
collaborate and do things with people [7], making the use of robotic platforms
as tools for experimental learning more approachable [31].
Based on these recent findings, and aiming to achieve fruitful empathic in-
teractions with learners, the EMOTE project1 designed, developed and eval-
uated a new generation of artificial embodied tutors that have perceptive ca-
pabilities to engage in empathic interactions with learners in a shared physi-
cal space. EMOTE adopted a learner-centric approach, applied to the design
of curriculum-driven learning scenarios, where personalised and pedagogically
sound learning strategies were employed by the tutor in order to successfully
adapt to the learner’s engagement and progress in the learning task. Towards
this end, two learning scenarios were developed related with geography: a map-
reading task and an activity to learn about sustainability. The EMOTE project
adopted personalised strategies to generate tutor interventions targeted to a
specific user and their needs. The tutor’s interventions took place at the ped-
agogical and empathic level and these interventions occurred in both learning
scenarios of the project. The main difference between the learning scenarios of
EMOTE concerns the number of learners that is included in the task. Therefore,
the map-reading task was performed at an individual level, in which one student
solved the task guided by a robotic tutor; while the sustainability activity is a
collaborative one in which two students and a robot (see Figure 1) need to build
a sustainable city together using a serious game called EnerCities [29].
In a long term study with the individual map reading activity, Serholt and
Barendregt (2016), have explored children’s social engagement to the empathic
robotic tutor [46]. This was performed by analysing their behavioural reac-
tions to socially significant events initiated by the robot, such as greeting, feed-
back/praise and when questioning learners. The results seem to show that
children reveal behaviours that indicate social engagement using a range of
communicative channels. Thus, while gaze towards the robot is the most com-
mon indication for all types of social events, verbal expressions and nods are the
1http://www.emote-project.eu/
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Figure 1: Sustainability Scenario in EMOTE.
most common for questions, and smiles appear usually after positive feedback.
In conclusion, this study shows that the behavioural responses that children
express reveal engagement with an empathic social robot, which could either be
understood as a developing social bond (e.g., [36] [26]) or a reaction to perceiving
the robot as a social actor [35] [48].
Role assignment is a way to organize interpersonal encounters and can result
in uncertainty decrease when facing a novel interaction with someone we just
met, or even to rediscover new roles within previous relationships [30] [43]. In
fact, most people have never interacted with a robot and specially in EMOTE,
most children have never seen a robot. As robots being created to fulfil specific
roles, such as of a robotic tutor, it would then be expected that users too would
assign the same role to that robot. Alves-Oliveira and collaborators (2016) have
studied how learners assign roles to an educational empathic robot whose role is
established from the beginning of the interaction [2]. This study compares the
role that children assign to an empathic robot who they have been interacting
with in the context of the collaborative sustainability task for a period of 2
months (long term interaction); and also compares the role that children assign
to a non-empathic robot in a short-term interaction with the same learning
activity. The results show that before knowing the empathic robot well, children
attribute the role of a friend and at the end of the long term interaction most of
children consider it a classmate. The role shift in children seems to be adapted
to the role of the robot, since they interact with it exclusively to learn. In the
second study, in which they have compared the role that children assign to a non-
empathic robot (compared to an empathic one, in a short term interaction), we
can see that they think the empathic robot is a friend, while the non-empathic
robot is perceived as a tutor. This can change the learning process, in which the
results suggest that children can feel more close in the interaction when learning
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with an empathic robot tutor compared to a non-empathic robot tutor.
In another study, it was investigated the expectations and satisfaction of
learners before and after having interacted with the empathic robotic tutor in
a school classroom. Students interacted with the empathic robot in the collab-
orative scenario of sustainability and the results seem to show that they had
high expectations towards the robot. When asked to rate their satisfaction level
after the experience of the learning interaction with the empathic tutor, their
satisfaction levels were also considerably high. Thus, this study demonstrates
that children feel satisfied to learn with an empathic robotic tutor [1].
As a conclusion remark, it seems important to reflect on the different roles
that robots can acquire in our societies. Some of these roles with require more
sophisticated and somewhat human-like characteristics, such as the ability to
show empathy. In EMOTE project, an empathic robotic tutor was created and
developed to teach children about sustainability and map reading abilities. The
results are promising but more research is needed. A special focus should also
be given to ethical and moral concerns of robots in the schools.
3.2 Robots That Share Their Emotions
It is undeniable at this point that emotions are a big part of human lives and
will be important to exist in human-robot interactions. It will be important for
robots to be able to ascertain from the others their emotions as well as share
their own, since a major step for meaningful interactions occurs when people
are able to communicate to others how they feel and are able to understand
other’s social signals (e.g. how he/she is feeling).
Starting from this idea, we aimed to explore emotional sharing in human-
robot interactions (for more information see [39]). For this, we approached its
role in a competitive setting, where people had to play individually a version
of the dots and boxes game [5] called Coins and Strings against a social robot
(see Figure 2). In this game, a set of coins are attached one another through
strings and each turn a participant can only take one string from the board. If
a string releases a coin (from other strings attached to it) the player wins that
coin for himself and gets an extra turn. The game ends when all coins have been
collected, the player with more coins, wins the game. Participants would each
play five boards, with its difficulty increasing. The robot would autonomously
play the game and comment on the actions taken with the emotional sharing
behaviour being manipulated. Participants would either be in the Sharing Con-
dition (the robot would do small talk and share its emotions towards the game
at the end of each board game) or the No Sharing Condition (the robot would
only do small talk- e.g. “This is going to be a hard game”).
For this to be possible, the FAtiMA Emotional Agent Architecture [16] was
used, integrated with Thalamus Framework [40] which in turn, connected to the
game (Unity3D) and the Emys robot [25]. The FAtiMA would update its own
internal state of the game and consequently the robot’s emotional state towards
the game actions. This emotional state would trigger emotion expression that
depending on its intensity could also trigger speech, for example if an action
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Figure 2: Experimental setting for the emotional sharing scenario
made Emys very happy with it, like winning, it would display a joyful facial
expression and at the same time say “Great!”. The robot cognitive behaviour was
done by FAtiMA with an AI for gameplaying, integrating a standard Minimax
Algorithm [44] to decide the best move to play and the desirability of an event.
This would generate different emotions according to OCC Theory of Emotions
[37]. On the other hand, in the Sharing Condition the FAtiMA agent had the
goal of sharing a summary of the more relevant emotions elicited in that board
(e.g. “Several minutes ago, I wanted to win the game which made me feel
frightened. Afterwards I played an important move. I was feeling really glad”).
We were interested in seeing if the presence of emotional sharing from the
robot to the user, would change the user perception of the robot (making it
more humanlike instead of machinelike) and the level of closeness felt towards
it. We found no significant differences between the user’s perceptions of the
robot in both conditions, suggesting that participants did not felt the robot
more humanlike by having the emotional sharing component. In order to test
our robot performance, we observed that participants in both conditions con-
sidered the robot to be intelligent and competent in the task (which was also
supported by only having 4 participants that were able to beat Emys in the
game). Regarding the level of closeness felt towards the robot, there were also
no significant differences between the conditions. This seems to suggest that the
emotional sharing behaviour is not having the effect we were hoping for. But
taking into account that most of the participants were loosing the games against
Emys we wondered if the robot competence could have been having some kind
of effect towards the emotional sharing behaviour. With Emys winning almost
all the games, it means it was also making victory summaries at the end of each
board game. Participants might have more easily seen the robot as a machine
because of that, a machine that always beats humans, nullifying the effect that
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we aimed for with the emotional sharing behaviour in this specific context.
In order to clarify this, we replicated our study [38] but this time we also
manipulated the robot competence: in one study the robot would have a high
competence in the game, in the other a low competence. In each study there
would be two conditions (Sharing or No Sharing) as in the previous study re-
ported. Results confirmed our manipulation of competence level and partici-
pants reported feeling more affect in the Sharing condition comparing to the
No sharing one, but again, the sharing behaviour did not show any difference
in the perception of the robot. When taking into account only the Competence
level of the robot, participants gave more attention to Emys when it had a lower
competence in the game (even though Emys spoke more in the high competence
study) and reported higher scores of empathic concern (other-oriented feelings
of concern for others) in Emys.
Taken this all together, we can conclude that for a competitive setting,
emotional sharing does not have the desired effect. The nature of this task,
surpasses the effect of hearing the other emotional state. Instead of bringing
them together, emotional behaviour looses its effect, with participants being
concentrated in winning the game. We still believe emotional sharing can be
an important component of human-robot interactions but the context were it
is implemented, strongly defines the effect it can have. Furthermore, emotional
disclosure is also more normally accepted between females, comparing to males
[17]. In both studies we had more males than females, this can also add to our
results as a strange behaviour to occur in a short interaction. Suggesting that
emotional sharing behaviour might be better implemented in a collaborative
scenario and perhaps in longer interactions.
3.3 Robotic Partners With Group-Based Emotions
Appraisal theories argue that emotional experiences are triggered by how indi-
viduals subjectively evaluate the events they perceive. So, for instance, when
two persons play a card game against one another, they are likely to have con-
trasting emotions during the game, provided they are both invested enough in
winning. More precisely, when one is happy for being ahead, the other is likely
to be sad or angry for being behind. Most computational models of emotions
are able to capture this notion quite satisfactorily. However, what if there are
two teams playing against each other rather than just two individuals? Then,
members of each team are now likely to also experience emotions based on how
the team itself is being affected by the events that happen. Such emotions are
referred to as group-based emotions [27]. While this may, at first, seem incon-
gruent with the notion of individual subjectivity put forth by appraisal theories,
it is possible to reconcile the two if we consider the process of group identifi-
cation, based on social identity theory [51]. This is a process that makes the
individual see himself or herself as a member of a social identity that is contex-
tually salient. When this happens, the subjectivity of the emotional appraisal
process is based on the social identity that is being adopted by the individual
at the moment, rather than the individual’s personality [21]. It is through this
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process that one can explain why someone can feel ashamed by immoral actions
conducted by members of their ingroup that they themselves did not commit.
As robots and humans start working together in teams to solve problems it is
important that the emotional apparatus of social robots is capable of simulating
an appraisal process that is also able to encompass social identities, in order
to generate group-based emotions. The potential of doing so is that it will
enable the creation of robots that are less self-centred and, consequentially, more
trustworthy. So far, most research on human-robot interaction has typically
focused on dyadic interactions, i.e., a single robot interacting with a single
human. However, there is a current growing trend that focuses on more complex
scenarios that involve multiple robots interacting with multiple people [9, 19, 18].
These more complex scenarios are better suited to test the potential impact of
group-based emotions.
Our first case-study that focuses on group-based emotions in social robots is
based on a tabletop card game, named Sueca2. This is a very popular Portuguese
card game that is played by four players that are divided in two teams. The
first version of this scenario was developed in the PArCEIRO project3, with
the aim of understanding how much people would trust a robot partner they
had interacted before compared to a robot partner they never interacted with.
An experiment was conducted where several groups of three participants played
Sueca with the EMYS robot for about an hour (see Figure 3), with one of them
being randomly assigned to be the robot’s partner. The obtained results showed
evidence that the scenario was able to increase how much trust was attributed to
the robot, but only for the group of participants that had a previous interaction
with it [12].
Figure 3: Sueca scenario in the trust experiment.
In the aforementioned experiment, the EMYS robot is able not only to de-
cide which card to play during its turn, but also to subjectively evaluate the
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sueca (card game)
3http://gaips.inesc-id.pt/parceiro/
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state of the game and trigger appropriate emotional responses that are con-
veyed both verbally and non-verbally. Similar to the emotion sharing scenario,
the emotional appraisal process of the robot is determined by the use of the
emotional agent architecture FAtiMA [16]. However, for being able to generate
group-based emotions, this appraisal process of FAtiMA was modified to have a
group identification mechanism, which makes the robot consider itself responsi-
ble for not only the cards it chooses to play but also for the cards that are played
by its human partner. In a sense, it is as if the robot considers its partner as
an extension of itself. Consequentially, this means that the robot is able to feel
group-based pride when its partner does a great play and also feel group-based
shame when the partner does a terrible move. In contrast, without the group
identification bias in the appraisal process, the robot will instead feel admiration
or reproach for the good or bad moves of its partner. To test this new appraisal
process, we plan to conduct an experiment using the same Sueca scenario but
with two human players, each playing with their own robotic partner. One of
the robots will have the group-based appraisal process activated and the other
robot will not. Our main hypothesis for this experiment is that the subjects
who play with the robot that has group-based emotions will have a significantly
higher identification with his or her team and consequentially a higher intrinsic
motivation associated to the task.
4 Future Directions: Exploring Empathy for Cre-
ating Moral Robots
The use cases that were previously described serve to illustrate the importance
of endowing social robots with different types of emotional capabilities for them
to be successful in helping or collaborating with people. But going into the
future, as autonomous robots become more pervasive in our society, and start
to be able to interact with people, and make decisions that impact our physical
world, the public in general and the research community in particular needs to
address important questions that concern the morality and ethics of human-
robot behaviour. One must consider that robots will have the power of making
decisions that will implicate humans and can range from moral decisions in
a military or government context for example, to more simpler decisions as
deciding if that student work reflects in a good grade or not.
A common starting point in the discussion of moral robots are the three
“Laws of Robotics”, which were introduced in the classical literary work of Asi-
mov [3]. Briefly, the first law states that robots should never harm a human
being, the second law dictates that robots should always obey human orders un-
less these orders violate the first law and, finally, the third law states that robots
should protect their own existence, except if it conflicts with either the first or
the second law. As they have been referenced in books and films multiple times,
these laws have shaped society’s expectations of what it means for a robot to
act in a moral manner. However, as hinted even in Asimov’s stories, these laws
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are an oversimplification and upon closer inspection, several researchers have
pointed out many practical and theoretical issues concerning their implementa-
tion [10, 11]. To give an example, the first law is incompatible with the notion
that a robot designed to rescue people would need to, sometimes, temporarily
harm a person in order to save his or her life.
In response to the issues found in Asimov’s laws, some authors have proposed
an alternative set of rules [10], but others have criticized the notion altogether of
having the morality of robots based just on a fixed ruleset [11, 52]. Indeed, one
must be careful with the limitations of applying conscious reasoning to morality.
While we are certainly capable of reaching moral conclusions starting from a
set of explicit principles, it does not mean that such principles are the ultimate
source of human morality. To further illustrate this point, psychopaths are able
to follow rules but they lack the ability to feel that something is morally wrong.
The 18th century philosopher David Hume was the first to bring forth the
idea that emotions are the basis for human morality. In his view, emotions are
responsible for triggering moral judgements, which are only then explained and
rationalized through reason. More recently, neuroscientists have found empirical
support for Hume’s idea that moral judgement involves emotional engagement
[22]. Following Hume’s footsteps, Hoffman developed a theory of morality that
places empathy at its core. In his words, empathy is “the spark of human concern
for others, the glue that makes social life possible.” [23, page 23]. One of its
most important aspects for moral reasoning, is that empathy prevents us from
acting out moral violations that would make rational sense, from an utilitarian
perspective. Empathy is thus not only beneficial for improving the ability of
social robots to engage with humans, as was previously illustrated, but it is
also an important component to consider when trying to answer the question of
what kind of capabilities should robots have to be moral.
Still, even though empathy plays a crucial role in human morality, it also
has its limitations, and sometimes may even interfere with moral decisions due
to its partiality [14]. More specifically, people feel more empathic distress for
in-group members and towards victims that are physically present compared to
those that are out of sight. Nevertheless, without empathy there would not be
any empathic distress at all. Moreover, it is possible that the artificial empathy
that is encoded in social robots is able to overcome current limitations of human
empathy, while keeping its social benefits.
Finally, asides from empathy, another key competence that will be required
for social robots to be moral is the ability to reason and communicate about
social norms [34]. The communication aspect is particularly important if we
consider that, no matter how thorough the robot designers are, it will be im-
possible for them to specify and program the set of all relevant norms into the
robot’s architecture. Instead, robots should be able to evolve their set of norms
by observation and communication with people. When robots become able to
learn from us, we will be able to learn from them as well.
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